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Considerable amounts of time and money are spent on job-training of
school-leavers graduated from higher-education institutions. More
than a half of the employees in our sample participated in job-training
between  graduation date (1999) and September 2000. The work in this
paper considers two aspects of the problem. First, the relationship be-
tween training probability/training length and the initial human capital
(proxied by level of education and in-school labour market experience)
is concerned with, and, second, some elements of the training-cost-
sharing decision is analysed. There are some signs that university edu-
cation reduces the probability of training as compared to college edu-
cation, whereas in-school labour market experience increases it. Uni-
versity education reduces training length, as well. In-school labour
market experience has no effect on the length of job-training. Another
important result is that school-leavers holding diplomas with
“narrower” types of education are more likely to obtain training, and
also to have longer training programmes. This implies a more severe
matching problem in the case of “narrower” types of education, possi-
bly due to prohibitive searching costs for finding a good-quality match.
Results for the cost-sharing decision are in line with Becker’s idea,
since the firm is less likely to entirely cover the costs of general train-
ing and more likely to finance job-specific training programmes.2
GALASI PÉTER
FELSŐFOKÚ VÉGZETTSÉGŰ PÁLYAKEZDŐK MUNKAERŐ-PIACI KÉPZÉSE
Összefoglaló
A felsőfokú végzettségű pályakezdők képzése jelentős erőforrásokat igé-
nyel. A mintánkban szereplő pályakezdők több, mint fele vett részt kép-
zési programban a végzést (1999) követő mintegy másfél év alatt. A ta-
nulmányban a kérdés két szeletét vizsgáljuk. Először az induló emberi
tőke (amit az iskolai végzettséggel és a tanulmányok alatti munkaerő-
piaci tapasztalattal közelítünk), valamint a képzésbe kerülés valószínű-
sége és a képzés hossza közötti kapcsolatot vizsgáljuk, másodszor a
képzési költségek munkavállaló és a munkáltató közötti megosztásának
néhány elemét vesszük szemügyre. Eredményeink arra utalnak, hogy az
egyetemi végzettség (a főiskolaihoz viszonyítva) csökkenti, míg a mun-
kaerő-piaci tapasztalat növeli a képzésbe kerülés valószínűségét.
Egyetemi végzettség emellett rövidebb képzési idővel is együtt jár,
ugyanakkor a munkaerő-piaci tapasztalat nem befolyásolja a képzés
hosszát. Fontos eredmény, hogy akár a képzésbe kerülés valószínűségét,
akár időtartamát vizsgáljuk, a szűk specializációval rendelkező pálya-
kezdők sokkal inkább a képzettségüknek nem megfelelő munkakörökben
helyezkednek el, mint a több foglalkozáshoz viszonylag jól illeszkedő,
általánosabb specializációval rendelkező pályakezdők, ezért nagyobb
valószínűséggel kerülnek képzésbe, továbbá képzésük időtartama is
hoszabb. A képzési költségek megosztásával kapcsolatos eredmények
megerősítik Becker feltevését, amely szerint a munkáltató kevésbé haj-
landó általános, mint munkahely-specifikus képzést finanszírozni.3
INTRODUCTION
Job training constitutes important part of both the labour market and the
educational system. A labour-market-centred human-capital approach to
the problem has become integral part of the labour economics since the
mid-60’s (for theoretical summaries see Becker 1962 and 1975, Hashimoto
1981, Parsons 1990, Stevens 1994).
In the ’90s, training seems to be more important as ever in Hungary, espe-
cially among young higher-education gra duates. When leaving full-time
education many higher-education graduates continue accumulating knowl-
edge and skills through formal or informal, on-the-job or off-the-job train-
ing. Training might improve the productivity of young school-leavers,
contribute to forming better job-employee matches, ameliorate their op-
portunity for obtaining stable and higher-paid jobs.
The paper focuses on two elements of the problem: first, the role education
level might play in determining the probability and the length of training,
and, second, the share of training costs between employer and employee
will be investigated.
As regards the relationship of education level with training probability (oc-
currence and length, etc) it is of great importance whether education level
and training are positively or negatively correlated. If the former holds then
differences in human capital between employees with lower and higher
levels of education will widen on the labour market, and the less educated
will have lower chances for ameliorating their labour market position by
training, and the more educated will be able to accumulate even more hu-
man capital. If the reverse is true then differences due to in-school human
capital will be diminished on the labour market.
The literature provides no unambiguous answer to the problem. This is not
surprising since actual predictions and results depend on both the theoreti-
cal contexts of the models and the properties of data (especially the time
horizon the samples cover). In a simple short-run setting, where more edu-
cation  implies higher job-productivity, and the training is intended to pro-
vide workers with additional skills and knowledge so as to reach actual
(fixed) job-productivity, more education is associated with lower training
probability for a given job, and this is the case if more education indicates
better learning abilities, as well. In a long-run utility- (profit-) maximisa-
tion model, where the more educated have better learning abilities thus
lower marginal training costs and/or higher returns to training, workers
with higher levels of education will experience more training, especially in4
the case of firms with long career ladders or „internal labour markets”. The
problem becomes more complex if jobs are allowed to be heterogeneous in
their job-specific skill-requirements (the amount of job-specific knowledge
needed in the job), because both kinds of model might then produce either
positive or negative coefficients depending on the distribution of levels of
education and learning abilities among jobs with different job-specific
skill-requirements. Some models (see Belzil and Hansen 2002 for an exam-
ple) distinguish between school ability (taste for school) and market ability
(earnings potential), both of them affecting the discount rate used in the
schooling/ labour market entry decisions, and that might have conse-
quences on the predicted relationship between training probability (occur-
rence, length) and education. If, for example, individuals with higher mar-
ket ability choose lower levels of schooling, and are more productive in a
job, given their better skills required by the job, then in a short-run fixed-
productivity-requirements setting they need less training, thus the more
educated will get more training. In a long-run setting, however, the result
might be the opposite; since individuals with higher market ability choose
less schooling, and have better learning skills required by the job, then their
marginal training costs will be lower and/or their returns to training higher,
thus they will be more likely to be trained, than individuals with higher
levels of education. The interpretation of empirical results is even less
clear-cut, since both ability and job-specific skill-requirements are nor-
mally unobserved.
The papers of Lillard and Tan (1992), Lynch (1992), van Smoorenburg and
van der Velden (2000), Goux and Maurin (2000), Ariga and Brunello
(2002), Garcia, Arkes and Trost (2002) assume/obtain either negative, or
positive correlation, or both, and the values of the estimated coefficients
also show a great variety of patterns. van Smoorenburg and van der Velden
(2000), focusing on the training probability of Dutch career-beginners, ar-
gue that higher level of education implies higher ability and this reduces
the costs of a given training, therefore level of education and training prob-
ability will be positively correlated. The estimated parameters support their
hypothesis, and the result is robust to model specifications. Almost the
same holds for Lillard and Tan’s paper, since in their empirical model, es-
pecially for the sample of young men, company training and educational
level are positively correlated up to 16 years of schooling, but then for in-
dividuals with 17 and more years of schooling the value of the coefficient
decreases, that is, the most educated less probably participate in training
that those with 16 years of schooling. In Ariga and Brunello’s paper more
education might lead to more training since education improve learning
skills therefore reduces marginal training costs but it might also be that the5
more educated get less training because they have higher marginal costs
either because they have lower learning skills in jobs requiring training, or
higher opportunity costs of training, or both. Their estimates result in a
negative relationship between education and training in the case of on-the-
job training. Goux and Maurin (2000) find that training is the least preva-
lent among the less educated but no significant parameter estimate is pro-
duced otherwise. Garcia, Arkes and Trost’s (2002) results show that, with
using  high school as the reference, both lower and higher levels of educa-
tion leads to lower training-participation probability. Lynch’s off-the-job-
training participation probit produces positive and significant parameters
for both high-school and post-high-school education (lower-than-high-
school education being the reference), but the value of the post-high-school
parameter is less than that of high-school one. Moreover her other estima-
tions produce mainly non significant coefficients. The empirical results are
then mixed due to different model specifications, and also different samples.
The second problem is how the employer and the worker share the costs of
training. In the spirit of Becker’s (1962) fundamental model, training might
be classified as perfectly general and specific. Training is (perfectly) gen-
eral if worker’s productivity (marginal product) increases by the same
amount with many employers. It is (completely) specific if the increase of
productivity with a given employer does not affect productivity with other
employers. Since both parties can terminate the contract in the future,
sharing the costs serves as an element of insurance against future losses in
returns. One implication of the model is that general (specific) training is
financed by the worker (the employer), and in-between (neither completely
specific, nor perfectly general) training implies cost sharing between the
parties. Other elements of the problem might be also of interest: how level
of education of the worker affects the cost sharing decision, that is, whether
the firm is more likely to finance the training for less or more educated
workers, how the proportion of costs covered by the firm or the worker is
related to the total cost of training, and, finally, how cost sharing between
the two parties changes in response to increases/decreases in (expected)
post-training wages.
In this paper we make use of a sample of Hungarian full-time higher-
education school leavers, graduated in 1999 whose September 2000 labour
market position has been observed. Only formal training of the actually
employed is considered, thus learning by doing is excluded from the analy-
sis, and the data do not allow us to distinguish between off- and on-the-job
training.6
DATA, ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The sample include young workers with higher education diploma, some
53 per cent of them took part in training and, on average, spent 61 days on
training between graduation (summer of 1999) and September 2000. The
sample is representative of full-time students of the Hungarian higher edu-
cation who finished their studies in 1999 and were employed in September
2000. Since the structure of the sample is not the same as that of the whole
population in terms of the number of graduates by higher-education insti-
tutions and types of education, here weighted data are used.
1
Three equations will be estimated: a training-participation-probability, a
training-length, and a cost-sharing equation.
Let us see first the training-probability equation. A key explanatory vari-
able – as we have seen in the literature – is human capital. In the spirit of
the standard, Mincerian human capital model (Mincer 1974), it has two
components: one accumulated by attending school and one on the labour
market (labour market experience). In our case both components are initial,
pre-labour market and pre-training human capital endowments. We know
the highest educational degree of the respondents, and we use this as a
proxy for human capital accumulated by attending school. Since our work-
ers are all higher-education graduates, this results in a dummy variable:
college (or bachelor) degree (with 2-4 years of higher education, = 0) and
university (or master) degree (with 5 to 7 years of higher education, = 1).
The proportion of university diploma-holders is 39 per cent.
2 For the other
component (labour market experience) we use in-school labour market ex-
perience. This is measured by a dummy: whether the respondent regularly
worked for pay during his/her study (no = 0, yes = 1), and almost one third
of the respondents possess in-school experience.
3 As regards the expected
sign of the coefficient the problem is similar to that of education. In a short-
run setting where training is intended to bridge the gap between initial hu-
man capital and actual productivity requirements in the job, if in-school
experience leads to higher productivity at the work place, the correlation
will be negative, and this would be the case if in-school experience indi-
cates good abilities/skills required by the job. In a life-cycle model if in-
school experience results in higher productivity, and/or indicates better
                                               
1 The weights were constructed on the basis of  institution- and type-of-education-level
higher-education statistics collected by the ministry of education.
2 For means and standard deviations of the variables, see Appendix Table A1.
3 It seems that in-school experience might be empirically important in wage determina-
tion (see Light 2001).7
learning skills in training, then the more experienced will be more likely to
be trained. When estimating the training-probability equation, the question
of sample selection arises since workers constitute a pre-selected sample of
higher-education graduates. For this reason we have estimated a probit with
sample selection (Maddala 1983) with a labour-market-participation and a
training equation, where the selection (labour-market-participation) equa-
tion contains the average level of unemployment of types of education that
is not also in the training probability equation. If the error terms of the two
equations are not correlated, the hypothesis of sample selection is rejected,
and the training participation probability equation will be reestimated by
simple probit.
In addition to variables proxying human capital endowments, two other
variables have been inserted in the model in order to capture the effect of
workers’ heterogeneity on training probability. A series of dummies has
been included so as to detect how types of education might affect training
probability (reference category: teachers in primary schools). These vari-
ables might reflect differences in labour demand  for skill s embodied in
types of education. A type of education represents a special combination of
skills learned in school, and the marketability of a given combination of
skills depends on the actual state of the labour market. This might influence
the quality of education/job match, and a better-quality match might lead to
lower training probability. An occupational concentration index
4 is also in-
serted into the equation. It shows how individuals with a given type of edu-
cation are distributed among occupations. Some types of education provide
skills that might be useful for a relatively large number of occupations –
they are labelled „broad” fields of education by van Smoorenburg and van
der Velden, some prepare students for a small number of occupations
(„narrow” fields of study). The concentration index is used to proxy this
problem. Its value is zero if individuals with a given type of education are
employed in only one occupation, it is one if individuals with a given type
of education are distributed evenly among occupations. A type of education
with zero value is, in this sense, very „narrow”, whereas a field of study
with a unit value is very „broad”. „Narrower” fields of study can assure
                                               












2 , where  io p   denotes the proportion of individuals with type of
education i working in occupation o, No is the number of occupations, and 0≤
o
i K ≤ 1.
If it is zero, then individuals with a given type of education are concentrated in one
occupation. If it is one, individuals with a given type of education are distributed
evenly among occupations (van Smoorenburg-van der Velden, 2000).8
education/job match of better quality but with relatively high searching
costs, that is, it might be costly to find a good match due to the „narrow-
ness” of the type of education. „Broader” fields of study might result in a
match of worse quality but with relatively low costs of searching. If an in-
dividual with a „narrow” type of education can find a job with a good-
quality match, he/she needs little or no training. If not, then much training
will be necessary in order to bridge the gap between actual skills and job
requirements. Individuals with „broader” types of education can be em-
ployed in many occupations but need some training due to the relative
worse quality of the match. The sign of the estimated coefficient can be
either positive or negative. Negative sign means that individuals with
„broader” („narrower”) types of education are less (more) likely to be
trained, thus „broader” types of education produce a better education/job
match than the „narrower” ones, and consequently  „broader” fields of
study imply less training costs. With a positive sign the reverse holds.
Finally, a series of firm-size dummies is included (firms with more than
1000 employees as reference). One can argue that firm’s size affects train-
ing costs. There are some signs that larger firms train their employees to a
greater extent than smaller ones (van Smoorenburg and van der Velden
2000), and this can be attributed to economies of scale larger firms might
have in providing and/or purchasing training services. As for the costs of
training they can be spread over a larger number of employees with larger
firms and/or larger firms can purchase training courses at lower prices. One
can also argue that larger firms provide more stable and better job opportu-
nities so that it is more advantageous for workers in larger firms to partici-
pate in training. If this is so, training probability and firm size will be posi-
tively correlated.
As regards the training-length equation, the dependent variable is the natu-
ral log of the length of training measured in days. The structure of the
problem is similar to that of training probability, but the question is not the
same. If training length is an indicator of resources spent on training, then
the relationship between human capital and the resources spent on training
is considered. Here a sub-sample of employees are considered, namely,
those having received training. The same explanatory variables are used as
in the training probability equation, for similar reasons and their interpreta-
tion is also similar.
The equation can be estimated by ols but it is very likely that the schooling
variable is endogenous. This might be due to the unobserved heterogeneity
of individuals in terms of productivity or/and ability needed in the job and
also to the heterogeneity of jobs in terms of firm-specific skill-9
requirements. Levels of education and (unobserved) productivity/ability
and/or firm-specific skill requirements might be  correlated, and as a con-
sequence ols would produce biased parameter estimates for the schooling
variable. The empirical model will be estimated by 2sls with one IV
5, and
we will check the direction of the bias by running ols, as well.
As an instrument the date (year) of admission to the higher education in-
stitution will be used. The individuals in our sample were admitted in dif-
ferent years and this variable must be correlated with the schooling vari-
able, since, first, persons graduated from colleges have 2-4 years of educa-
tion, whereas for those attended universities the length of study is 5 to 7
years, and, second, all of them graduated in the same year (1999). In addi-
tion, it is very unlikely that the date of admission would be correlated with
the length of training. We have run two tests to check these assumptions.
The instrument can be considered valid if regressing the potential endoge-
nous variable on all the exogenous variables and the instrument and using
ols, the partial effect of the instrument on the potential endogenous variable
proves significant (produces a significant t value). As regards the endoge-
neity of education a regression-based Hausman test is used (Wooldridge
2002). First, education is regressed on the instrument and the exogenous
variables, second, the ols residuals of this equation are included in the re-
duced-form equation and it is estimated by ols. If the parameter estimate of
residuals is significant, the exogeneity of education can be rejected. Test
results are included in tables reporting 2sls estimations, and they support
both the validity of the instrument and the endogeneity of education.
The cost-sharing equation might be estimated by either ordered probit
and/or probit and/or probit with sample selection. As regards the possible
dependent variable for an ordered probit, three states may be distinguished:
the training is financed by the worker and/or his/her family (= 1), this af-
fects some 45 per cent of the workers, and by the worker and the firm (= 2),
9 per cent, and entirely by the firm (= 3), 46 per cent. If the estimator is the
probit or the probit with sample selection, the best candidate for the inde-
pendent variable is a dummy: whether the training is financed entirely by
the firm (=1) or otherwise (=0). Since it is likely that (self-)selection into a
training programme is not random, the coefficients of both the ordered, and
the simple probit might be biased. For this reason we have estimated the
model by probit with sample selection. As for the selection equation, our
                                               
5 Another potentially endogenous variable is the in-school experience dummy. We
could not find a valid instrument for this variable. We have run several model for
finding one but either the potential instrument did not prove valid, or the model
specification was problematic with having produced negative R-squared statistics.10
training probability equation is used (see above). The model is identified
since there are some variables in the selection equation that are not in the
cost sharing equation.
The explanatory variables include two dummies proxying the gen-
eral/specific nature of the training, the two human capital indicators (edu-
cation and experience), the length of training (in days, natural log), the
post-training wage (wage rate, natural log), and  a series of firm-size dum-
mies.
As regards the construction of the variable(s) for the character of the train-
ing, we know its objective/purpose (learning a foreign language; computer
skills; supplementary skills needed in the actual job; special skills needed
in the actual job; skills needed in another job, learning for personal interest;
training prescribed by the law), that might have something to do with the
genelar/specific nature of the training. Some of the objectives, however,
cannot be interpreted in the specific/general frameworks (training required
by the law), for some it is hard to decide whether it would be specific or
general (skills needed in another job, personal interest). We have two kinds
of training programmes that might be considered as general: foreign lan-
guage and computer skills. Foreign language and computer skills are more
or less transportable, that is, they can be utilised at many firms. Strictly
speaking no information can be obtained from the data on whether the
training is firm-specific or not. Rather, some training programmes seem to
be job-specific, namely, special and supplementary skills needed in the ac-
tual job. Although these are not necessarily firm-specific training pro-
grammes, one can argue that the knowledge and skills accumulated with
the help of these programmes are less transportable than foreign language
and computer skills, thus in the spirit of the Becker’s model we can expect
that firms will be more likely to finance these programmes, than those pro-
viding general knowledge and skills. We have then included two dummies
one for general and one for job-specific training programmes, and the ref-
erence is the dummy representing all the other programmes being assumed
a mixture of not perfectly specific and not completely general programmes.
If the classification works and the assumptions are correct, we expect a
positive sign for the specific, and a negative one for the general dummy.
Education and in-school labour market experience might play a role in
cost-sharing decisions. If more education and experience indicate better
abilities, learning skills and higher productivity in the job, then, from long-
run profit-maximisation considerations, it might be advantageous for the
firm to cover the training costs for the better educated and more experi-
enced to a greater extent.11
Higher post-training wage implies higher post-training costs, that is, less
expected profit at fixed expected post-training productivity. This might in-
duce firms to cover smaller proportions of the training costs in order to
minimise their losses for the training and post training period. If this is so,
then higher post-training wages would result in smaller firm’s shares. At
the same time, post-training wage may reflect firm’s expectations as re-
gards post-training productivity of the trainee. If the firm expects high pro-
ductivity increase due to training, that is, high post-training productivity,
then it would be willing to cover a greater proportion of the training costs,
than in the case of lower post-training productivity and wage. Then higher
post-training wage results in a more intensive participation in financing the
training programme on the part of the firm. Training length is also included
in the equation so as to control for differences in the amount of training
workers need.
Firm-size dummies are inserted in the equation, and it is assumed that due
to economies of scales, lower fixed per capita training costs, and better in-
tra-firm job-mobility opportunities, larger firms cover the costs of training
with higher probability than smaller ones.
RESULTS
Estimation results for the training probability and length are reported in
Table 1 and 2. As regards training probability (Table 1), having made use
of probit with sample selection seems to be justified for the error terms of
the training probability and employment probability equations are corre-
lated. The parameter estimate for university education is negative but it is
significant only at the p = 0.1 level, as for the coefficient of in-school expe-
rience the model has produced a positive and significant estimate. This
suggests that there are some signs that the university diploma results in
lower training probability than the college diploma, and that in-school ex-
perience increases the probability of training. The first result is consistent
with a fixed-productivity-requirement model where training is aimed at in-
creasing productivity level and the less educated are initially considered
less productive than those with higher education. The second one can be
interpreted in the framework of a long-run model: in-school experience
might result in higher productivity, indicate better learning skills in train-
ing, then the more experienced will be more likely to be trained.
We have estimated the training-length equation by ols and 2sls (Table 2).
The instrument-validity and the endogeneity tests have proven successful12
(as it can be seen at the bottom of the tables displaying estimation results),
so 2sls estimations are considered as producing the „true” coefficients, but
in order to check the direction of the parameter biases for the education
variable it is worth comparing the ols and 2sls results.
Both ols and 2sls estimations have produced significant and negative pa-
rameters for the education variable. No significant coefficient has been ob-
tained for the in-school experience variable. Thus  in-school experience
does not affect training length, and persons with university education par-
ticipate in shorter training programmes, than those with college education.
The difference is quite large: the average university diploma-holder spends
44 per cent less days on training than the average person with college de-
gree. Moreover, the ols estimation is biased downward, it underestimates
the effect of education on training length with a coefficient value indicating
23 per cent less days of training for university education. The negative re-
lationship between education and training length is consistent with a short-
run fixed-productivity-requirements model where training is intended to
help workers with less human capital in reaching the productivity level de-
manded by the job. The direction of the bias can be interpreted as follows:
persons with college education systematically differ from those with uni-
versity education in their abilities needed in the job or/and their earnings
potential (market ability). More able individuals choose lower levels of
schooling (college education), then the ols underestimates the strength of
the relationship for when estimating the model by ols unobserved abilities
cannot be taken into account.
The estimated coefficient of the occupational concentration index is sig-
nificant and negative in both the training-probability and the training-length
equations and for all specifications, suggesting a more severe matching
problem for persons having a „narrow” type of education. Those having
obtained a diploma with „narrower” types of education have higher training
probability and longer training programmes. This implies that they are
more likely to enter jobs with a job/education match of worse quality than
those having „broader” types of education, that might be due to higher
searching costs of finding a good match.
Agricultural education results in the highest probability of training, foreign
language, humanities, economics&business, technical education and infor-
matics also produce relatively high parameter values. The high coefficient
value associated with agricultural education suggests severe matching
problems due to decreasing demand of the agriculture in the ’90s and the
parallel increase in higher-education output. As regards diplomas in hu-
manities and foreign languages it might be that the proportion of school-13
leavers with unsatisfactory practical (job-related) knowledge is high. The
relatively high training probability for persons with economics&business,
technical education, and specialised in informatics is a kind of surprise
since it might be assumed that the demand for these types of education is
high and that the knowledge provided by these types of education can be
used in many jobs. The result shows that high demand does not exclude
high probability of training.
As for the effect types of education may have on the length of the training,
diplomas in natural sciences, humanities, foreign languages and agricul-
tural education lead to longer training. Technical education, busi-
ness&economics, and informatics are all characterised with shorter periods
of training. Medical education implies even less training in terms of train-
ing length, meaning that school-leavers with medical diplomas mostly enter
jobs in health care.
Training probability and length putting together, agricultural education
produces high probability of training and long training, and this also holds
for humanities and foreign languages. Natural sciences result in low train-
ing probability and long training. Finally, technical education, informatics
and business& economics are associated with relatively high training prob-
ability and short periods of training.
Firm size is positively related to training probability (most of the coeffi-
cients are significant with greater values for bigger firms), and school-
leavers spend more time on training with smaller firms (50 or less employ-
ees) as compared to the biggest firms.
Results from cost-sharing equations are reported in Table 3. Panel A of the
table displays the estimated model, in panel B marginal effects are shown.
The assumption that the cost-sharing equation might produce biased pa-
rameter estimates in the case of a simple probit is supported by our results
since the selection (training probability) equation and the cost-sharing
equation are not independent, their error terms are correlated (see the Wald
test at the bottom of the table).
As regards the education variable, the parameter estimate is significant and
positive, that is, the firm is more likely to cover the costs of training for
persons with university than those with college education. This confirms
the hypothesis that more education indicate better abilities, learning skills
and higher productivity, and less marginal training costs, thus the firm is
more willing to finance the training of university diploma holders.14
As regards in-school experience, no significant coefficient has been re-
sulted from the estimations. The same holds true of the wage-rate variable,
its parameter estimations are significant only at p=0.15 level.
The length of training is negatively correlated with the probability with
which the firm will entirely cover the costs of training. It is in line with an
interpretation that the profit-maximising firm ex ante sets the amount of
money it is willing to spend on training, and if the actual training pro-
gramme requires more time or higher costs then it reduces its share in the
total training costs.
We can see that the variables for general and job-specific training have per-
formed well. The parameters are significant and  they have the expected
signs: a negative one for general and a positive one for job-specific train-
ing. This implies that the results are in accordance with Becker’s idea about
the relationship between interfirm transportability of skills produced by and
the cost-sharing of training.
Firm-size is also positively correlated with firm’s willingness to cover
training costs, the parameters for all the dummies are significant and nega-
tive (biggest firms are the reference), and the value of the coefficient gets
higher as firm’s size increases. This is in line with hypotheses concerning
economies of scales, lower fixed-costs of training, and more intensive in-
trafirm mobility with bigger firms.
SUMMARY
Firms and employees spend considerable amounts of time and money on
the job training of school-leavers graduated from higher-education institu-
tions. More than a half of the employees in our sample participated in job
training between  graduation date (Spring-early Summer 1999) and Sep-
tember 2000. The average length of the training programmes were 61 days.
The work in this paper considered two aspects of the problem. First, the
relationship between training probability/training length and the initial hu-
man capital (proxied by level of education and in-school labour market ex-
perience) was considered, and, second, some elements of the training-cost-
sharing decision were analysed.
There are some signs that university education reduces the probability of
training as compared to college education. This is consistent with a short-
run fixed-productivity requirements model where training is intended to in-
crease the productivity of the career-beginners in order to reach the level of15
productivity needed in the job. At the same time, in-school labour market
experience increases the probability of training. This might mean that in-
school experience indicates better job-abilities resulting in lower marginal
costs of and/or higher marginal returns to training.
University education reduces the length of the training, as well. Thus
school-leavers with university diploma have shorter training programmes
than those graduated from colleges. This is also consistent with a short-run
fixed-productivity-requirements approach to job-training decision, for the
more educated have more initial human capital that results in higher initial
productivity thus less additional human capital is needed at fixed job-
productivity requirements. One important result is that the coefficient for
education estimated by ols is downward-biased. This might be interpreted
as follows: persons with college education have better abilities needed in
the job and/or greater earnings potential (market ability) than those with
university education, therefore more able individuals choose lower levels
of schooling (college education). In-school labour market experience has
no effect on the length of job-training.
One can conclude that there is a negative relationship between level of
education and job-training costs. If the school-leaver enters the labour mar-
ket with more education, then he/she needs a shorter training programme so
as to reach the productivity level required by the job. Then it might be ad-
vantageous for the cost-minimising firm to hire school leavers with univer-
sity rather than those with college education. If the costs of education plus
training a worker needs for reaching  the productivity requirements of a
given job are fixed then hiring a more educated school-leaver for the job is
tantamount to the redistribution of the total education and training costs to
the detriment of state budget that covers most of the costs of education.
Another important result with potential policy implications for the higher-
education institutions is that school-leavers holding diplomas with
“narrower” types of education are more likely to obtain training, and also to
have longer training programmes. This implies a more severe matching
problem in the case of “narrower” types of education, possibly due to pro-
hibitive searching costs for finding a good-quality match.
Results for the cost-sharing decision are in line with Becker’s idea, since
the firm is less likely to entirely cover the costs of general training and
more likely to finance job-specific training programmes.
As regards the relationship between education and training costs, the firm is
rather willing to cover the costs of training for the more educated (university
degree) than those with college education. Longer training programmes re-
duce, the size of the firm increases firm’s share in training costs.16
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TABLES
Table 1
Determinants of training probability
A. Estimated coefficients
Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
University -0.077 0.041 -1.90 0.058
Experience 0.214 0.039 5.50 0.000
Type of education
Agricultural 0.544 0.162 3.37 0.001
Humanities 0.546 0.141 3.88 0.000
Foreign Language 0.479 0.149 3.21 0.001
Small Languages 0.506 0.320 1.58 0.114
Physical Education 0.585 0.224 2.61 0.009
Teaching (BA) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Informatics 0.490 0.140 3.51 0.000
Technical 0.529 0.147 3.60 0.000
Arts 0.139 0.265 0.52 0.602
Medical 0.488 0.088 5.57 0.000
Law 0.489 0.124 3.93 0.000
Business&economics 0.559 0.148 3.77 0.000
Social Sciences 0.557 0.191 2.91 0.004
Natural Sciences 0.236 0.138 1.71 0.087
Occupational concentration -1.088 0.313 -3.47 0.001
Firm size
10 or less -0.333 0.063 -5.30 0.000
11 to 50 -0.236 0.054 -4.38 0.000
51 to 100 -0.240 0.059 -4.08 0.000
101 to 500 -0.101 0.054 -1.86 0.064
501 to 1000 -0.152 0.072 -2.13 0.033
1000+ 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Constant 0.405 0.184 2.20 0.027
 Number of obs 5331.000
 Censored obs 1170.000
 Uncensored obs 4161.000
 Wald chi2(21) 176.610
 Prob > chi2 0.00018
B. Marginal effects
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
University -0.030 0.041 -1.90 0.058
Experience 0.084 0.039 5.50 0.000
Type of education
Agricultural 0.215 0.162 3.37 0.001
Humanities 0.215 0.141 3.88 0.000
Foreign Language 0.189 0.149 3.21 0.001
Small Languages 0.199 0.320 1.58 0.114
Physical Education 0.230 0.224 2.61 0.009
Teaching (BA) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Informatics 0.194 0.140 3.51 0.000
Technical 0.208 0.147 3.60 0.000
Arts 0.055 0.265 0.52 0.602
Medical 0.193 0.088 5.57 0.000
Law 0.193 0.124 3.93 0.000
Business&economics 0.220 0.148 3.77 0.000
Social Sciences 0.219 0.191 2.91 0.004
Natural Sciences 0.093 0.138 1.71 0.087
Occupational concentration -0.423 0.313 -3.47 0.001
Firm size
10 or less -0.129 0.063 -5.30 0.000
11 to 50 -0.092 0.054 -4.38 0.000
51 to 100 -0.093 0.059 -4.08 0.000
101 to 500 -0.039 0.054 -1.86 0.064
501 to 1000 -0.059 0.072 -2.13 0.033
1000+ 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Probit with sample selection
Independent variable: has the individual participated in training?
The selection equation includes: whether the individual is employed or not
(dependent variable), an education, an in-school experience, 14 types of
education dummies plus the average unemployment rate of types of
education  (explanatory variables)
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(1) =  39.15   Prob > chi2
= 0.000019
Table 2
Determinants of the training lengt
ols
Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
University -0.257 0.101 -2.53 0.011
Experience -0.126 0.089 -1.41 0.159
Type of education
Agricultural 1.381 0.388 3.56 0.000
Humanities 1.562 0.343 4.55 0.000
Foreign Language 1.402 0.365 3.84 0.000
Small Languages 0.927 0.688 1.35 0.178
Physical Education 1.078 0.513 2.10 0.036
Teaching (BA) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Informatics 0.338 0.344 0.98 0.325
Technical 0.888 0.356 2.49 0.013
Arts 0.022 0.415 0.05 0.958
Medical -0.493 0.208 -2.37 0.018
Law 1.186 0.279 4.26 0.000
Business&economics 0.728 0.360 2.02 0.043
Social Sciences 0.909 0.458 1.98 0.048
Natural Sciences 1.573 0.328 4.79 0.000
Occupational concentration -2.580 0.747 -3.45 0.001
Firm size
10 or less 0.508 0.146 3.48 0.001
11 to 50 0.347 0.134 2.59 0.010
51 to 100 0.001 0.147 0.00 0.997
101 to 500 0.169 0.138 1.23 0.220
501 to 1000 -0.046 0.180 -0.26 0.797
1000+ 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Constant 4.336 0.431 10.05 0.000
N 2063
F7 . 4 5




Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
University -0.582 0.197 -2.96 0.003
Experience -0.096 0.092 -1.04 0.298
Type of education
Agricultural 1.980 0.503 3.93 0.000
Humanities 2.151 0.467 4.61 0.000
Foreign Language 1.967 0.475 4.14 0.000
Small Languages 1.414 0.822 1.72 0.085
Physical Education 1.511 0.566 2.67 0.008
Teaching (BA) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Informatics 0.733 0.405 1.81 0.070
Technical 1.412 0.456 3.10 0.002
Arts 0.491 0.456 1.08 0.281
Medical -0.379 0.218 -1.74 0.082
Law 1.607 0.357 4.50 0.000
Business&economics 1.256 0.458 2.74 0.006
Social Sciences 1.338 0.517 2.59 0.010
Natural Sciences 2.128 0.439 4.85 0.000
Occupational concentration -3.663 0.946 -3.87 0.000
Firm size
10 or less 0.504 0.147 3.43 0.001
11 to 50 0.334 0.135 2.48 0.013
51 to 100 0.002 0.147 0.01 0.991
101 to 500 0.190 0.139 1.37 0.172
501 to 1000 -0.033 0.183 -0.18 0.856
1000+ 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Constant 4.925 0.528 9.32 0.000
N 2056
F7 . 3 1
 Prob > F 0
 R-squared 0.0626
Dependent variable: length of the training (natural log)
Endogenous variable: university; Instrument: date (year) of admission into
the higher-education institution
Validity of instrument: t-value = -16.67
Endogeneity of education: t-value 2.04 (p=0.042)21
Table 3
Determinants of cost-sharing
A. Estimation results Robust
Coef. Std. Err z P>|z|
Legth of training -0.299 0.031 -9.60 0.000
Wage rate 0.051 0.035 1.46 0.144
Job-specific training 0.129 0.057 2.25 0.025
General training -0.181 0.072 -2.53 0.012
University 0.207 0.061 3.37 0.001
Experience 0.021 0.057 0.37 0.710
10 or less -0.826 0.101 -8.16 0.000
11 to 50 -0.703 0.078 -8.97 0.000
51 to 100 -0.559 0.086 -6.47 0.000
101 to 500 -0.258 0.080 -3.24 0.001
501 to 1000 -0.252 0.100 -2.51 0.012
Constant 0.079 0.241 0.33 0.741
B. Marginal effects Robust
dy/dx Std. Err z P>|z|
Legth of training -0.080 0.010 -7.68 0.000
Wage rate 0.014 0.009 1.46 0.144
Job-specific training 0.034 0.016 2.21 0.027
General training -0.048 0.019 -2.48 0.013
University 0.057 0.018 3.16 0.002
Experience 0.006 0.015 0.37 0.711
10 or less -0.162 0.015 -11.13 0.000
11 to 50 -0.162 0.016 -10.17 0.000
51 to 100 -0.125 0.016 -7.90 0.000
101 to 500 -0.064 0.018 -3.53 0.000
501 to 1000 -0.061 0.022 -2.80 0.005
 Number of obs 3590
 Censored obs 1975
 Uncensored obs 1615
 Wald chi2(11) 227.91
 Prob > chi2 0
Probit with sample selection; dependent variable: the firm entirely covers
the costs of training
The selection equation includes: whether the worker participated in training
or not (dependent variable), an education, an experience, 14 types of
education and 6 firm-size dummies plus an occupational concentration in-
dex (explanatory variables)




Means, standard deviations, distributions of variables
a) Means and standard deviations Mean Std.dev.
Training length (natural log) 3.104 1.775
Occupational concentration 0.850 0.168
Wage rate (natural log) 6.082 0.726
b) Dummy variables
Proprotion of the trainees 0.528
Proportion of those having university education 0.389
Proprotion of those having in-school experience 0.323
c) Training costs are covered by
Firm 0.463
Firm and worker 0.092
Worker 0.445
Total 1.000






















10 or less 0.135
10-50 0.266
51-100 0.164
101-500 0.198
501-1000 0.077
1000+ 0.161
Total 1.00023